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Abstract
In voting theory, simple questions can lead to convoluted and sometimes
paradoxical results. Recently, mathematician Donald Saari used geomet-
ric insights to study various voting methods. He argued that a particular
positional voting method (namely that proposed by Borda) minimizes the
frequency of paradoxes. We present an approach to similar ideas which
draw from group theory and algebra. In particular, we employ tools from
representation theory on the symmetric group to elicit some of the natu-
ral behaviors of voting profiles. We also make generalizations to similar
results for partially ranked data.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 A Brief Introduction to Voting Theory
Our society is very familiar with the process of voting. We vote in political
elections for mayors, senators, and presidents. Committees vote on which
actions they want their group to take. Voting is also a process which we
essentially take part in each day. We ‘vote’ whenwe go out with our friends
and need to decide which restaurant to go to or which movie to see. Voting
takes place whenever a group needs to pool preferences to make an overall
decision.
Unfortunately, it is not always easy to make a single choice when given
the preferences of many voters. Not only are there different ways of vot-
ing, but there are also many ways to count those votes. In many political
elections, we choose our favorite candidate and give no more information.
But there are also situations in which voters might be asked to give a full
ranking of multiple alternatives, such as in a marketing survey. If we then
choose to give a number of points to these items according to where they
were placed in each ranking, this would be referred to as a positional tally
method. For example, if we were to ask voters to rank three candidates, we
might tally their votes by giving two points to a candidate every time he or
she is ranked as a top choice, and one point to a candidate every time he or
she is ranked as a second choice. The candidate with the largest number of
points in the end would be the winner.
Each positional tally method can be represented by a weighting vector,
w, whose entries correspond to the number of points given to a voter’s first,
second, . . . , last choice. For convenience, we will often normalize these vec-
tors so that their entries range from 1 to 0. For example, if we give one point
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to a voter’s top choice, and no points to any other candidate in their rank-
ing, this would be represented by the weighting vector w = [1, 0, . . . , 0].
This is similar to the plurality voting scheme, where we are essentially ask-
ing voters to choose only their top candidate. Later, we will also discuss
the Borda Count, which has weighting vector wBorda = [1, n−2n−1 ,
n−3
n−1 , . . . , 0],
where n is the number of candidates.
Alternatively, we could compare candidates pairwise, and give points
according to how many times one candidate beats each other candidate. In
other words, candidate A wins over candidate B if A is ranked higher than
Bmore times than B is ranked higher than A. There is also approval voting,
where voters simply give out one point to each candidate of whom they
approve.
This naturally leads to the question of which method is the “best”—
which method most accurately represents the intention of the voters. Al-
though many methods of voting had been introduced for centuries prior,
this debate made its way significantly into academia in the 18th century.
The mathematician and philosopher Marie Jean Antoine Nicolas de Cari-
tat Condorcet brought the pairwise method, first recorded by Ramon Llull
of Spain in the 13th century, to the attention of the French academy (3). In
1785, Condorcet published the paper Essai sur l’application de l’analyse la
probabilite des decisions rendues la pluralite des voix (Essay on the Applica-
tion of Analysis to the Probability of Decisions Rendered by a Plurality of
Votes). In this paper, he proposed the idea that if a candidate were to win
all head-to-head comparisons, then that candidate should win the over-
all election. He recognized, however, that this method would not always
guarantee a winner. He also discussed what has become known as the Con-
dorcet paradox: in head-to-head comparisons, a society can prefer candidate
A over candidate B, candidate B over candidate C, and candidate C over
candidate A. In other words, the societal preferences in pairwise tallies
may not be transitive. Because of his influence in bringing pairwise voting
into focus, the method of pairwise comparison is also often referred to as
the Condorcet method. The requirement that a method elects the Condorcet
winner (if one exists) is called the Condorcet criterion.
Condorcet’s paper spurred a debate with another French mathemati-
cian by the name of Jean Charles de Borda (3). Borda was known for his
work on engineering in themilitary and his contributions to developing the
metric system. He worked with Condorcet, alongside Laplace, Lavoisier
and Legendre, on the Commission of Weights and Measures (founded in
1790). Borda challenged Condorcet and Llull’s method on the grounds that
it was not entirely workable. Often, Condorcet’s method will show cyclic
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preferences, and fail to produce a winner in circumstances which do not
intuitively suggest a tie. Instead, Borda proposed a method developed by
Nicholas of Cusa in the 15th century. He proposed the positional tally for
n candidates which gives n points to a voter’s top choice, n − 1 points to
the second choice, and so on (as mentioned previously, we will normalize
these values for our purposes). This method was also prone to produc-
ing ties, but was more likely to produce a winner. These two mathemati-
cians continued to debate which of these methods was the most ‘fair’ and
productive almost until Condorcet’s arrest and death in 1794. Unfortu-
nately, since their debate was mostly philosophical (despite some use of
certain axiomatic and probabilistic tools), and since both systems had no-
table strengths andweaknesses, theywere not able tomakemuch headway.
To explicitly illustrate how these two tallying methods might differ, we
look at an example. Say we ask voters to rank three candidates—A, B, and
C. To represent A beating B, we will write A > B (sometimes we will
simply write AB). Suppose 24 voters distribute their votes in the following
manner:
votes ranking votes ranking votes ranking
3 A > B > C 8 B > A > C 0 C > A > B
8 A > C > B 0 B > C > A 5 C > B > A
In other words, three people rank A above B above C, eight people rank A
above C above B, and so on. We would then collect this data into a profile p
which represents how many people voted for each ranking of candidates.
The profile for this outcome, if we order the rankings lexicographically, is
p = (3, 8, 8, 0, 0, 5). If we use the Borda Count to tally these votes (with
weighting vector w = [1, 1/2, 0]), A gets 15 points, B gets 12 points, and C
gets 9 points. This results in an overall ranking of A > B > C. However, if
we choose to calculate the pairwise ranking, we would find the following
tally:
points pair points pair
11 A > B 13 B > A
19 A > C 5 C > A
11 B > C 13 C > B
In other words, A ranked higher than B eleven times, where B ranked
higher than A thirteen times, which gives that B beat A overall. Similarly,
we get that A beats C by fourteen points, and C beats B by two points.
Notice that this does not give us a transitive ranking at all. Also, this tally
disagrees with our Borda tally on two accounts—the comparison of A and
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B, and the comparison of B and C. This is what is referred to as a paradox,
because two seemingly fair tallying methods result in differing outcomes.
Following Condorcet and Borda’s debate, many people attempted to
modify these procedures to improve upon them. For example, in 1876,
mathematician Charles Ludwidge Dodgson (better known as Lewis Car-
roll) proposed a procedure in which a Condorcet winner will be chosen in
the case that one exists; if there is no Condorcet winner, then the candidate
who needs fewest ballots to be changed to become the Condorcet winner
will be chosen. John Kemeny proposed a similar system in 1959, where the
winner is the candidate who requires the fewest number of rank pairs being
exchanged (flipped) on voters’ ballots to make that candidate win by Con-
dorcet’s rule. In 1958, Duncan Black constructed a method which blended
Condorcet’s and Borda’s methods. Namely, the Black winner will be the
Condorcet winner, unless one fails to exist—otherwise, the Borda winner
will be chosen. Each of these theories provided additional strengths to Con-
dorcet methods (i.e. we are more likely to calculate a winner), but many of
them also resulted in new paradoxes and weaknesses (for example, the re-
sulting winner may no longer be intuitive) (4).
1.1.1 Arrow’s Theorem
A major advancement in voting theory was made in the mid-20th century
by the Nobel laureate economist Kenneth Arrow. With contributions from
Blau and Murakami, he used axiomatic methods to prove that there can
not exist an entirely fair voting system. More specifically, he chose four
preferred criteria for a voting scheme to exhibit and showed that they were
inconsistent. These four criteria were Universality, Independence of Irrel-
evant Alternatives, Citizen’s Sovereignty, and Non-dictatorship (2). Uni-
versality (or unrestricted domain) means that the election procedure should
provide a full ranking (with strict preferences) for all possible sets of data.
Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives requires that any ranking of a subset of
alternatives will be unaffected by changes in rankings of other alternatives.
Citizen’s Sovereignty (or non-imposition) requires that the election procedure
allows for all possible outcomes. Non-dictatorship simply means that more
than one person’s vote can affect the outcome. Arrow proved that if the
first three criteria were true for a given election procedure, then it must be
a dictatorship. This was a profound message for voting theorists, because
it meant that we could not possibly construct a truly fair system, at least
according to Arrow’s criteria. There was some debate following this result,
questioning the nature of each of these requirements. In particular, the
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K B C R
bA bB bC rA rB rC
ABC
ACB
BAC
BCA
CAB
CBA

1
1
1
1
1
1


1
1
0
−1
0
−1


0
−1
1
1
−1
0


−1
0
−1
0
1
1


1
−1
−1
1
1
−1


1
1
−2
1
−2
1


−2
1
1
1
1
−2


1
−2
1
−2
1
1

Table 1.1: Saari’s basis for three alternatives.
Universality criterion may be a bit strict when a profile would intuitively
suggest a tie. However, in each modification, the adjusted rules still proved
to be inconsistent. Thus, it is perhaps no longer useful to ask the question
“How can we construct a fair system?” Instead, the focus has been shifted
to a search for the system which is the ‘most’ fair, and how we might rede-
fine our concept of fairness.
1.1.2 Donald Saari and Geometric Methods
In the late 20th century, mathematician Donald Saari began to tackle this
revised objective using geometric methods. He began describing voting
structures as vector spaces. As mentioned before, we can discuss profiles
and positional weightings as vectors. We can then naturally begin to study
the vector spaces in which these vectors reside. This is precisely what Saari
did. He decomposed profile spaces using geometric ideas in order to ex-
plain how paradoxes arise, and with what significance. By analyzing the
dimensions of various components, he could make statements as to how
often certain tally methods would agree with others. In particular, he has
concentrated on comparing pairwise and positional methods—modifying
the positional methods to agree with the pairwise outcomes as often as pos-
sible.
In three major papers (6; 7; 8), Saari divided profile spaces into four sub-
spaces: the Kernel (the all ties space, generated by the all-ones vector), the
Basic space (containing profiles for which the positional and Condorcet tal-
lies agree), the Condorcet space (containing profiles which only influence
Condorcet outcomes), and the Reversal space (containing profiles which
only influence positional outcomes).
For example, Table 1.1 outlines Saari’s basis for a full ranking of three al-
ternatives. The columns correspond to the four subspaces outlined above:
the Kernel (K), the Basic space (B), the Condorcet space (C), and the Rever-
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K B C R
bA bB bC rA rB rC
A
B
C
 2+ 2t2+ 2t
2+ 2t
  2−1
−1
 −12
−1
 −1−1
2
  00
0
  2− 4t−1+ 2t
−1+ 2t
 −1+ 2t2− 4t
−1+ 2t
 −1+ 2t2− 4t
−1+ 2t

AB
BA
AC
CA
BC
CB

3
3
3
3
3
3


2
−2
2
−2
0
0


−2
2
0
0
2
−2


0
0
−2
2
−2
2


1
−1
−1
1
1
−1


0
0
0
0
0
0


0
0
0
0
0
0


0
0
0
0
0
0

Table 1.2: Tallies for Saari’s basis for three alternatives.
sal Space (R). For both B and R, each of the three vectors corresponds to a
particular candidate, and any two of the three vectors generates the third.
For example, in B, the first vector corresponds to the first candidate, A: 1
vote is made for rankings where A is top-ranked (such as A > B > C), −1
vote is made for rankings where A is bottom-ranked (such as B > C > A),
and no votes are made otherwise, giving bA = (1, 1, 0,−1, 0,−1)T. The
three basic vectors are linearly dependent (namely, bA + bB + bC = 0, so
we can choose any two for our basis. Similarly, rA is constructed by giving
1 point wherever A is top or bottom ranked, and 2 points otherwise, giving
rA = (1, 1,−2, 1,−2, 1)T.
Remark: It may be useful to note here that although the concept of
’negative votes’ is unintuitive, it is acceptable for our purposes (and rel-
atively essential). Notice that since the all-ones vector does not affect the
outcome of either procedure, we can simply shift a profile by multiples
of this vector to recover an intuitive profile. So, for example, the pro-
file p′ = (−1, 4, 4,−4,−4, 1) elicits the same results under both maps as
p = (3, 8, 8, 0, 0, 5) did in our previous example. Similarly, scaling a profile
by any positive constant will also produce similar results. This is to say, if a
candidate wins in one profile, he or she may win by more or fewer votes in
absolute terms, but will still win. So, again, p′ = (6, 16, 16, 0, 0, 10) would
produce the same result under both maps as p above.
Table 1.2 outlines the image (or outcomes) of the basis profiles under the
positional and pairwise tallies. The first row shows how many points are
given to each candidate under the positional scheme, where our weighting
vector is w = [1, t, 0]. For example, the basis vector for K will result in all
three candidates receiving 2+ 2t points under the positional map. Notice,
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as described, vectors in K will give rise to a tie, regardless of our choice of
t. The Basic vectors will always lead to one candidate winning, and the rest
tying (for the Basic vector corresponding to candidate X, X will win). For
example, bA gives A 2 points, B −1 points, and C −1 points, yielding an
overall ranking of A > B ∼ C (where ‘∼’ indicates a tie). The Condorcet
vector will not contribute at all to the outcome, as it is all zeros, again re-
gardless of our choice of t. The Reversal space, however, will contribute
depending on our choice of t. For the Reversal vector corresponding to
candidate X, X will win if t < 1/2 and X will lose if t > 1/2. However, if
t = 1/2, as in the Borda Count, the Reversal space will no longer contribute
to the final outcome. In other words, if t 6= 1/2, then if a profile vector has
a non-trivial projections into the Reversal space, we will see a difference be-
tween the positional and pairwise outcomes. Therefore, a larger percentage
of profiles have the potential to elicit this kind of paradox.
The second row of Table 1.2 shows the image of these basis vectors un-
der the pairwise method. Just as was the case under the positional tally,
vectors in K will give rise to a tie, and the Basic vectors will always lead to
one candidate winning, and the rest tying (for the Basic vector correspond-
ing to candidate X, X will win). However, as projected for the pairwise
tally, the Condorcet space will contribute, contradicting the positional tally.
Therefore, there is no t where this procedure agrees with the positional
procedure for all profiles. Also, the Reversal space will not contribute un-
der any circumstances. However, if we choose t = 1/2, each of the re-
sults for the positional outcome evaluate to zero in the positional space,
thus providing fewer dimensions of conflict with the pairwise outcome. In
fact, for the three-candidate case, if we use the Borda Count, the only cir-
cumstances in which the two tally methods will contradict each other are
when the profiles have non-trivial projections onto the vector generating
C (c = (1,−1,−1, 1, 1,−1)T). This is what we mean when we say that the
Borda Count reduces the amount of conflict between the positional and
pairwise tallies.
This was, in fact, one of Saari’s main contributions to the field—proving
mathematically that the positional tallying method which agrees most of-
ten with pairwise tallies for full rankings is the Borda Count, and that this
result is unique.
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1.2 New Directions
One possible natural extension of Saari’s work is to provide similar decom-
positions using algebraic techniques. This thesis will contain the neces-
sary algebraic background and translations of voting theory into algebraic
terms to make use of these techniques. For example, we have already seen
how profiles can be represented as elements of a vector space. With this
idea there come many tools from linear algebra. Abstract algebra lends it-
self well to working with both the vector spaces of profiles, as well as with
maps associated with them. In particular, we can describe various rankings
of candidates as permutations—elements of the symmetric group. Tally-
ing these profiles can be described as mapping their profile vectors from
one space to another. As we will show later, these maps are QSn-module
homomorphisms. So in particular, representation theory will prove to be
quite useful. We will see how representation theory can help us to study
the profile space in terms of the maps we use to tally the votes.
Another interesting extension which we will be exploring here is an
analogous study of partially ranked data. It is not always practical to ask
for a fully ranked list from voters (for just ten candidates, this would give
voters 3, 620, 800 choices!). A partial ranking calls for voters to place can-
didates into ranked sets. For example, we might ask voters to tell us, out
of six candidates, their top choice, then their next two favorite, and then
their three least favorite, without making any distinctions within these cat-
egories. For the most part, we will be concentrating on the partial ranking
of n alternatives, where voters are asked to fully rank their favorite k alter-
natives. Representation theory can provide useful tools for analyzing these
kinds of votes as well. A significant amount of theory has been developed
for objects which we will use to represent partially ranked data (11). This
theory will prove useful for making generalization to partially ranked data.
This thesis proceeds as follows. In Chapter 2, we describe the mathe-
matical framework in which we study voting theoretical objects. In partic-
ular, we introduce the reader to key tools for working with the symmetric
group and permutation modules. Also, we devote some time to discussing
how we treat familiar voting structures within our algebraic context. In
Chapter 3, we revisit the case of fully ranked data, but within this algebraic
context. In Chapter 4 we apply the tools developed in the previous two
chapters to partially ranked data, achieving analogous results. In the fi-
nal chapter, Chapter 5, we discuss possible further directions that algebraic
techniques could take voting theory.
Chapter 2
Mathematical Framework
We have already reviewedmany of the economic terms necessary to under-
stand the framework in which we are examining voting. In this chapter, we
will discuss more of the algebraic background necessary to understand our
approach. The theory behind the first two sections of this chapter can be
found in Dummit and Foote’s Abstract Algebra (1) and Sagan’s The Symmet-
ric Group (11). We will also further discuss how to translate voting-related
concepts into algebraic language in the third section.
2.1 Permutation Modules
First, we examine the tools which we use to represent the data itself. Re-
call that the symmetric group on n elements, Sn, is defined to be the set of all
permutations of n objects, together with the binary operation of (function)
composition. In the case of asking voters to provide a full ranking on n
candidates, we can consider each of the possible rankings as elements of
Sn. Recall that a group ring RG is simply the ring of formal sums ∑g∈G rgg
ranging over a finite multiplicative group G, where the coefficients rg are
coming from a commutative ring Rwith identity 1 6= 0. Thus, we can think
of any profile as an element of the group ring QSn (in this case each pro-
file only has integer coefficients, but Q allows for scaling as described in
Chapter 1). However, if we wish to study the outcomes of partially ranked
procedures, we can draw on the following generalized analog to the sym-
metric group.
As mentioned in Chapter 1, we can think of partially ranking candi-
dates as placing candidates into ranked sets. One way of expressing these
ranked sets is in terms of objects called tabloids.
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Definition 2.1. λ = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λl) is a (combinatorial) composition of n, writ-
ten λ  n, if each λi is a positive integer and ∑li=1 λi = n. λ is a partition
of n if it is a composition, and for all i < j, λi ≥ λj. The Ferrers diagram, or
shape, of λ is then an array of n dots having l left-justified rows with row i
containing λi dots for 1 ≤ i ≤ l.
For example, λ = (2, 2, 1)  5. The Ferrers diagram for λ = (2, 2, 1) is
• •
• •
•
.
Definition 2.2. Given composition λ  n, a Young diagram of shape λ is an
array tλ obtained by replacing the dots of the Ferrers diagram of shape
λ with the numbers 1, 2, . . . , n bijectively. Two diagrams are equivalent if
the sets of elements in each corresponding row are equal. Each of these
equivalancy classes is a Young tabloid of shape λ (or a λ-tabloid).
For our example of λ = (2, 2, 1), a few possible non-equivalent λ-tabloids
would be
1 2
3 4
5
1 3
2 4
5
2 5
1 4
3
.
The lines between the rows are to emphasize the equivalence within rows.
The following tabloids are a complete set of equivalent tabloids of a partic-
ular configuration:
1 2
3 4
5
∼
2 1
3 4
5
∼
1 2
4 3
5
∼
2 1
4 3
5
.
In total, there are 5!2!2!1! = 30 of these tabloids of shape λ = (2, 1, 1). In
general, there are n!λ1!λ2!...λl ! tabloids of shape λ = (λ1,λ2, . . . ,λl)  n.
Just as it was natural to express full rankings as elements of Sn, we can
now express partial rankings as tabloids in Xλ, where Xλ is defined as the
set of all λ-tabloids. Similarly, just as we can express profiles for fully-
ranked data as elements of QSn, we can now express profiles for partially-
ranked data as elements of QXλ. Again, this is simply the ring of formal
sums ∑tλ∈Xλ qtλ with coefficients q ∈ Q. Notice now that we can also as-
sociate an action of Sn on these tabloids. Namely, the action of Sn on n
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elements induces an action on a tabloid of shape λ  nwith the same set of
elements for entries. For example, if we have the partial ranking
1 2
3 4
5
,
we can permute it on the left, say, with the transposition (13) ∈ Sn (swap 1
and 3):
(13) ·
1 2
3 4
5
=
2 3
1 4
5
.
We callQXλ the permutation module corresponding to λ, and denote it by Mλ.
Notice, for example, that for λ = (n), Mλ is isomorphic as a QSn mod-
ule to Q. This would be equivalent to simply asking voters to rank every-
one the same. The profile, then, would record exactly the number of people
who voted. Alternatively, if λ = (1, 1, . . . , 1), then Mλ is isomorphic as a
QSn module to QSn itself. This would be equivalent to asking voters to
give a full ranking of n candidates. Thus, any analysis for the case of full
rankings can also be done in terms of these permutation modules.
Remark: Note that for any λ  n, Mλ and Mσ(λ) are isomorphic as mod-
ules, where σ permutes λ. This is to say, M(n−3,1,1,1) is isomorphic as aQSn-
module to M(1,1,1,n−3). Thus, analyzing tabloids of shape (n − 3, 1, 1, 1) is
equivalent to analyzing tabloids of shape (1, 1, 1, n − 3). For the sake of
convenience, we assume that each composition λ is a partition.
We will now move on to review some of the larger algebraic framework
in which we will be analyzing these permutation modules.
2.2 Representation Theory
In this section, we discuss some of the algebraic tools necessary to analyze
our profile spaces. First, we will examine methods for separating a space
into useful subspaces.
Recall that if U and V are subspaces of vector space W which intersect
trivially at {0}, then their (internal) direct sum, U ⊕V, is defined as
U ⊕V = {u+ v | u ∈ U, v ∈ V}.
The phrase “decomposing a space” then refers to expressing it as a direct
sum of subspaces.
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Definition 2.3. If R is a ring with identity, then a (left) R-module is defined
to be an abelian group M together with an action of R on M such that, for
all r, s ∈ R, m, n ∈ M, the following four relationships hold:
1. (r+ s)m = rm+ sm,
2. (rs)m = r(sm),
3. r(m+ n) = rm+ rn, and
4. 1Rm = m.
An R-submodule of M is a subgroup N of Mwhich is closed under the action
of R. Moreover, if M only contains {0} and M as R-submodules, then M is
irreducible.
The permutation modules described in section 2.1 are QSn-modules.
Note that if R is also a field, which is certainly the case with Q, saying that
M is an R-module is equivalent to saying that it is a vector space over R.
Thus, every permutation module Mλ, in addition to being a QSn-module,
is also a vector space over Q. We will sometimes use these terms inter-
changeably, as it is easy to think of profiles as vectors in vector spaces.
Often, we will want to decompose our permutation modules into irre-
ducible submodules. The following theorem guarantees that we can do so
in our case, when permutation modules are associated with the ring QSn.
Theorem 2.1. (Maschke’s Theorem) Let G be a finite group, and F be a field
whose characteristic (the additive order of 1F) does not divide |G|. If M is a non-
trivial FG-module, then M can be expressed as the direct sum of irreducible sub-
modules, i.e.,
M ∼= N1 ⊕ · · · ⊕ Nk,
where each Ni is an irreducible FG-module.
Note that in our case, F = Q. The characteristic of a field is defined
to be 0 if 1F does not have finite order, so the characteristic of Q does
not divide the order of any Sn. Thus Maschke’s theorem applies. How-
ever, this decomposition may not be unique. Since our goal is to separate
a space into particular subspaces based on their behavior under various
procedural maps (as Saari did for the fully-ranked case), it would be use-
ful to understand in what ways this decomposition may be unique. An
isotypic component of M is the direct sum of all isomorphic copies of a par-
ticular irreducible submodule in a given decomposition of M. For exam-
ple, if M ∼= N1 ⊕ N1 ⊕ N2 ⊕ N3 ⊕ N3, where N1, N2, and N3 are distinct
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non-isomorphic irreducible submodules, then the isotypic components of
M are 2N1, N2, and 2N3. An isotypic decomposition then is a decomposition
of a module M as in Maschke’s theorem, but with irreducible submodules
grouped into isotypic components.
Theorem 2.2. If Ui are isotypic components of M, then the decomposition
M = U1 ⊕ · · · ⊕Uk
is unique up to order of the Uis.
This statements is valuable largely because it gives us a stable decom-
position of any profile space.
Definition 2.4. If R is a ring, and M and N are R-modules, an R-module
homomorphism is defined as a map ϕ : M → N such that
1. ϕ(m1 +m2) = ϕ(m1) + ϕ(m2) for all m1,m2 ∈ M, and
2. ϕ(rm) = rϕ(m), for all r ∈ R,m ∈ M.
The last theorem in this section pertains directly to the behavior of irre-
ducible subspaces under R-module homomorphic maps. In particular, we
will be exploring voting procedures as tally maps. Thus the following theo-
rem will allow us to discuss irreducible subspaces in terms of their relation
to a particular procedure.
Theorem 2.3. (Schur’s Lemma) If M1 and M2 are two irreducible R-modules,
then any nonzero R-module homomorphism from M1 to M2 is an isomorphism.
Essentially, this says that for any portion of an irreducible subspace of
our profile space to contribute to the outcome of a particular procedure,
the entire subspace must contribute. From what we have already seen, we
might guess then that, for example, the Reversal space in Saari’s decompo-
sitionmust be the direct sum of irreducible subspaces, as it seems to behave
in this manner. However, we must first know if our procedural functions
are indeed QSn-module homomorphisms.
2.3 Voting Theory in Algebraic Terms
Now that we have built up some of the mathematical background for our
approach, we can begin to apply these concepts to voting. First, let’s take a
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critical look at howwemight represent our tally procedures in an algebraic
framework.
Just as we treat our profiles and outcomes as vectors, we can think of
the process of tallying votes as mapping from one vector space to another.
If we think of the profile space for rankings of the shape λ ` n as the
permutation module Mλ (as defined in section 2.1), we can also think of
the outcome space for the pairwise procedure as the permutation module
M(n−2,1,1). This is because each tabloid in M(n−2,1,1) corresponds to a given
ordered pair. For example, the pair A > B can be depicted as
A
B
CD . . .
.
Thus, we can think of the pairwise procedure as a function from Mλ to
M(n−2,1,1). Similarly, the positional procedure can be represented as a func-
tion from Mλ to M(n−1,1). However, as we have seen, if we fix an order on
Xλ, we can also represent profile vectors as elements ofQ|Xλ|. Thus, we can
write these tally maps as matrices.
For example, in the case of fully ranking three candidates, the pairwise
function P can be written as
P =

1 1 0 0 1 0
1 1 1 0 0 0
0 0 1 1 0 1
1 0 1 1 0 0
0 0 0 1 1 1
0 1 0 0 1 1
 .
Here, we have fixed the ordering of both the full rankings and the ordered
pairs lexicographically. The columns correspond to the possible rankings of
candidates, where the rows correspond to the ordered pairs. For example,
the element in the first column and the first row is a 1 because each vote for
the full ranking A > B > C gives one point to the pair A > B. However, the
element in the first column, but in the last row is a 0 becauseC does not rank
above B in the same full ranking. Note that there may be some ambiguity
as to how we might give points in the case of ties in partial rankings. We
will address this in Chapter 4, treating the general case of giving t points
for ties.
Similarly, if we let w = [1, t, 0] be our weighting vector, then we can
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write the positional function Tw as
Tw =
 1 1 t 0 t 0t 0 1 1 0 t
0 t 0 t 1 1
 .
Here, the columns still correspond to the full rankings, but now the rows
correspond to each individual candidate. So, in the first column, each vote
for A > B > C gives one point to A, t points to B, and zero points to C.
Now, if wewish to apply Schur’s lemma, wemust first ensure that these
maps are indeed QSn-module homomorphisms.
Theorem 2.4. All pairwise and positional maps areQSn-module homomorphisms.
Proof. We begin by describing a general map between permutations mod-
uleswhichwill reduce easily to both the positional and pairwisemaps.
Let Mλ and Mµ be permutation modules for tabloids of shape λ =
(λ1, . . . ,λl), µ = (µ1, . . . , µm) ` n, such that the partition µ is formed
by combining consecutive values of λi. For example, if λ = (n −
4, 1, 1, 1, 1), we might have µ = (n− 3, 2, 1). Let |Xλ| = L and |Xµ| =
N.
Our restriction of µ simply implies that we are mapping partial rank-
ings into a space which represents examining subrankings. For exam-
ple, mapping from λ = (n− 3, 1, 1, 1) to µ = (n− 2, 1, 1) represents
counting up rankings of three candidates from n by comparing sub-
sets ranking two candidates from n. This is of course the pairwise
map.
Let v = (v1, . . . , vN) be a vector in QN with to following restriction.
Recall that a natural basis of Mλ is Xλ = {tλi }Li=1, the set of all tabloids
of shape λ. Fix one of these tabloids and call it tλ1 . For every σ ∈ Sn
such that σtλ1 = t
λ
1 (σ is in the stabilizer of t
λ
1 ), if σt
µ
i = t
µ
j , then vi = vj.
This vector will be used to give points to subsets of candidates.
We know, since Sn acts transitively on Xλ, there is some σi ∈ Sn such
that tλi = σit
λ
1 for all t
λ
i ∈ Mλ. Let Tv(tλi ) be defined as follows:
Tv(tλi ) =
N
∑
j=1
vjσit
µ
j .
First, we must check that Tv is well defined. Thus, let α, β ∈ Sn have
the property that αtλ1 = βt
λ
1 = t
λ
i . We know that β can be described as
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the product of α and an element of the stabilizer of tλ1 . In other words,
β = ασ, where σtλ1 = t
λ
1 . Therefore,
Tv(βtλ1 ) =
N
∑
j=1
vjβt
µ
j
=
N
∑
j=1
vjασt
µ
j
=
N
∑
j=1
vjαt
µ
j (by our restraint on v)
= Tv(αtλ1 )
Thus Tv is well defined.
Note now that the following equation holds:
Tv(tλ1 ) =
N
∑
j=1
vjt
µ
j .
Recall that Tv is a QSn-module homomorphism if
1. Tv(p1 + p2) = Tv(p1) + Tv(p2) for all p1,p2 ∈ Mµ, and
2. Tv(α · p) = α · Tv(p), for all α ∈ QSn,p ∈ Mµ.
The first follows directly from the linear nature by which we defined
Tv. To illuminate the second, we rewrite Tv(tλi ) as follows:
Tv(tλi ) =
N
∑
j=1
vjσit
µ
j
= σi
N
∑
j=1
vjt
µ
j
= σiTv(tλ1 ).
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Similarly for any γ ∈ Sn,
Tv(γtλi ) =
N
∑
j=1
vjγσit
µ
j
= γ
N
∑
j=1
vjσit
µ
j
= γTv(tλi ).
Extending linearly to all vectors, we see that Tv(α · p) = α · Tv(p), for
all α ∈ QSn,p ∈ Mµ. Therefore Tv is a QSn-module homomorphism.
Notice that Tv can be described as a matrix whose columns are per-
mutations of the vector v according to how the corresponding σi per-
mutes the basis elements of Mµ.
In particular, for the positional method, v is precisely the weight-
ing vector w, λ is the shape of rankings in the profile space, and
µ = (n− 1, 1). Our restriction above on v simply translates to giving
candidates who tie the same number of points. Therefore, all posi-
tional maps are also QSn-module homomorphisms.
Finally, in the case of the pairwise map, we take v to be the first col-
umn vector of the pairs matrix. Again, if σ stabilizes the first rank-
ing, then it only permutes candidates who tie. Thus all pairwise rela-
tionships are preserved by swapping these candidates in the pairwise
space. For example, if A and B tie in a ranking, then C beats A only
if C also beats B. Similarly λ is the shape of rankings in the profile
space, and µ = (n − 2, 1, 1). Therefore, the pairwise map is also a
QSn-module homomorphism.
Now that we know that Schur’s lemma is applicable to our problem,
the next question is how exactly it applies to our permutation modules.
To answer this, we will need to have some understanding of how these
permutation modules decompose into irreducible subspaces. As discussed
in Sagan (11), there is an injection from partitions of n to cyclic modules.
For each partition µ ` n, we will denote the corresponding module as Sµ.
Moreover, when the field fromwhich we draw scalars isQ (which is true in
our case, as asserted previously), these modules are irreducible. Also, the
Sµ for µ ` n form a complete list of irreducibleQSn-modules overQ. Sagan
provides a relatively simple algorithm for computing the decomposition of
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composition λ decomposition of Mλ
(n− 1, 1) Mλ ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1)
(n− 2, 1, 1) Mλ ∼= S(n) ⊕ 2S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1)
(n− 3, 1, 1, 1) Mλ ∼= S(n) ⊕ 3S(n−1,1) ⊕ 3S(n−2,2) ⊕ 3S(n−2,1,1)
⊕S(n−3,3) ⊕ 2S(n−3,2,1) ⊕ S(n−3,1,1,1)
(1, 1, 1) Mλ ∼= S(3) ⊕ 2S(2,1) ⊕ S(1,1,1)
(1, 1, 1, 1) Mλ ∼= S(4) ⊕ 3S(3,1) ⊕ 2S(2,2) ⊕ 3S(2,1,1) ⊕ S(1,1,1,1)
(1, . . . , 1) ` n Mλ ∼= S(n) ⊕ (n− 1)S(n−1,1) ⊕ 2(n− 3)S(n−2,2)
⊕ 12 (n− 1)(n− 2)S(n−2,1,1) ⊕ · · · ⊕ S(1,...,1)
Table 2.1: A decomposition of some important permutation modules.
Mµ into these irreducible modules. Though we will not be going into this
algorithm in depth here, Table 2.3 provides some important examples of
decompositions of common spaces.
Again, according to Theorems 2.1 and 2.2, these direct sum decomposi-
tions are unique up to isotypic components. Also, note that each of these
decompositions has one isomorphic copy of S(n). This irreducible mod-
ule will correspond the the subspace spanned by the 1N vector, the all ties
space under any tally map For example, let’s return to the 3-alternative case
discussed on Chapter 1. As mentioned in section 2.1, we can represent the
profile space for full rankings on three candidates as M(1,1,1). As we can see
from table 2.3, this has the following decomposition:
M(1,1,1) ∼= S(3) ⊕ 2S(2,1) ⊕ S(1,1,1).
Again, S(3) corresponds to the all-ones space, or Saari’s Kernel (we must be
careful here, as we mean something very different by ‘kernel’—so we will
differentiate through context and capitalization). The dimension of (S(2,1))
is 2 and the dimension of (S(1,1,1)) is 1. If we look back at Table 1.1, we can
quickly see that Saari’s Condorcet space must be an irreducible subspace,
as it is the only portion of the profile space which is in the kernel of one
map, and not in the kernel of the other. Thus, since this is the only sub-
space of dimension 1 which is not the all-ones space, the Condorcet space
is isomorphic to S(1,1,1). Now we are only left with the Basic space and the
Reversal space, both of dimension 2. This implies that they must both sub-
spaces of the remaining isotypic, and therefore must both be isomorphic
to S(2,1). In the following chapters, we will further explore these kinds of
dimensional and homomorphism-related arguments.
Chapter 3
Exploring Full Rankings with
Algebraic Theory
Armed with the tools to discuss voting structures in an algebraic context,
we will begin with the case of fully ranked data in an attempt to recover
some of the previously-established results in the field of voting theory.
Namely, wewill uncover an algebraic explanation for why the Borda Count
is the unique positional tally yielding the fewest dimensions of conflict with
the pairwise tally on fully ranked data.
First, as discussed in Sections 2.1 and 2.3, we can represent fully-ranked
data on n candidates as elements of the QSn-module M(1,...,1). Similarly
we can represent the pairs and positional tally spaces as M(n−2,1,1) and
M(n−1,1), respectively. Recall that both of these tally maps are QSn-module
homomorphisms. Thuswe can apply Schur’s lemma (Theorem 2.3) to these
maps and immediately reveal from the decompositions in Table 2.3 which
portions of this profile space even have the potential of contributing to ei-
ther the pairwise or positional outcomes. For the pairwise procedure, the
map is as follows:
P : M(1,...,1)
∼= S(n)⊕(n− 1)S(n−1,1) ⊕ 2(n− 3)S(n−2,2) ⊕
(
n− 1
2
)
S(n−2,1,1) ⊕ . . .
→ M(n−2,1,1) ∼= S(n) ⊕ 2S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
Therefore, we know that anything after the S(n−2,1,1) isotypic in M(1,...,1)
must be in the kernel of P since none of the remaining irreducible sub-
modules have corresponding isomorphic copies in the pairs space. So the
only portions of the profile space which could potentially contribute to the
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pairwise outcomes are irreducible subspaces isomorphic to S(n), S(n−1,1),
S(n−2,2), or S(n−2,1,1). Similarly, for the positional procedure, we have
Tw : M(1,...,1) ∼= S(n) ⊕ (n− 1)S(n−1,1) ⊕ . . .
→ M(n−1,1) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1).
So any profile not in either the S(n) or S(n−1,1) isotypic components inM(1,...,1)
must be in the kernel of Tw since none of the remaining irreducible sub-
modules have corresponding isomorphic copies in the positional space.
When we ask the question of how to minimize conflict between the two
tally procedures, embedded in that question is one of how to maximize
overlap amongst the kernels of each map. In other words, we want it to be
the case that if p is in the kernel of one map, then it should be in the kernel
of both. Otherwise, as in our example outlining Saari’s three-alternative
case in Chapter 1, we will have unnecessary conflict where profiles tie un-
der one map, but elicit a winner under another. Also, if a profile p com-
pletely ties under both maps, and is in neither of their kernels, then it must
be in the all-ones space (S(n)) of the profile space. If it is in neither of their
kernels, and is not a complete tie, then the only other possibility is that p
is in the isotypic (n − 1)S(n−1,1). Moreover, if we want to maximize the
“number” of these kinds of profiles, it is clear that this will occur when the
same copy of S(n−1,1) is in the orthogonal complement to the kernels of both
maps.
But how many isomorphic copies of S(n−1,1) could possibly allow for
such an agreement? Certainly, the pairs map is fixed in the case of full
rankings. So this overlap is entirely dependent on our choice of weighting
vector. The decomposition of the pairs space in Table 2.3 indicates that
there might be two copies of S(n−1,1) in the image of the pairs map, which
could possibly give us more freedom in our choice of weighting vectors.
However, this is not the case.
Theorem 3.1. If P : M(1,...,1) → M(n−2,1,1) is the pairs map, then
img(P) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
In particular, P is not surjective.
Proof. We will show this using a dimension argument. As we will show
later (in Theorem 4.1), the pairs map has rank (n2) + 1. In short, this is
because for any arbitrary pair AB, we can recover how many points
will be assigned to B > A from the number of points assigned to
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A > B along with the total number of votes. Thus, we only need one
vector corresponding to each pair (for example, showing one point
for A > B and no points for any other ordered pair), along with the
all-ones vector to reconstruct the entire image of P. Every other vector
in the image of P can be expressed as a sum of these basis vectors.
Now, we will note again that
M(n−2,1,1) ∼= S(n) ⊕ 2S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,2) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
By Schur’s lemma, we know that the image of the pairs map will be a
direct sum of a subset of these irreducible submodules. Thus we only
need find which integer coefficients a, b, c, and d will give
rank(Pt) = a · dim(S(n)) + b · dim(S(n−1,1))
+ c · dim(S(n−2,2)) + d · dim(S(n−2,1,1)). (3.1)
These irreducible modules have the following dimensions:
dim S(n) = 1
dim S(n−1,1) = n− 1
dim S(n−2,2) = (n−12 )− 1
dim S(n−2,1,1) = (n−12 ).
Substituting into equation 3.1 we get the following equation:(
n
2
)
+ 1 = a · 1+ b · (n− 1) + c ·
((n− 1
2
)
− 1
)
+ d ·
(
n− 1
2
)
.
Using the identity (x2) =
1
2 (x)(x− 1), and expanding both sides, this
yields
(1/2)n(n− 1) + 1 =
(1/2)(n2 − n+ 2) = a+ b(n− 1) + c((1/2)(n− 1)(n− 2)− 1)
+ d((1/2)(n− 1)(n− 2))
= a+ nb− b+ c((1/2)n2 − 3/2n)
+ d((1/2)n2 − 3
2
n+ 1)
= (1/2)((c+ d)n2 + (2b− 3c− 3d)n
+ (a− b+ 2d)).
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Since n is arbitrary, this gives us the following system of equations:
2a− 2b+ 2d = 2
2b− 3c− 3d = −1
c+ d = 1.
This system then has the solutions b = 1, a + d = 2 and c + d = 1.
But d can only take on the values 1 and 0. If d = 0, then a = 2. But
a can only take a value of 1 or 0 as well. Thus d = 1, which gives
a = 1, b = 1, c = 0. Thus img(Pt) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
Thus, we are forced to construct a positional map which includes one
particular copy of this module in the orthogonal complement to the kernel
in order to fulfill our maximization criterion above. The following theorem
shows that this fact forces a unique weighting vector w.
Theorem 3.2. Let Tw be the positional tally map on n candidates with weighting
vector w. Then ker Tw = ker Tw′ if and only if w = w′
Proof. The fact that w = w′ implies ker Tw = ker Tw′ is trivial, so we
will simply explore the reverse implication. Let Tnw be defined as the
positional map on n candidates, and let w = [1,w2, . . . ,wn−1, 0] be
a normalized weighting vector. First, examine the case of maps on
two candidates (n = 2). This is simply the identity matrix on two
elements:
T2w =
(
1 0
0 1
)
.
Vacuously, this theorem holds for n = 2, as there is only one weight-
ing vector.
However, this will not prove to be a very useful base for induction, so
we look also at the positional map on n = 3 candidates with weight-
ing vector w = [1, t, 0]:
T3w =
 1 1 t 0 t 0t 0 1 1 0 t
0 t 0 t 1 1
 .
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If t 6= 1, 0, the null space for this matrix is
NS(T3w) = span
{

1
−(1− t)
−1
1− t
0
0
 ,

1− t
−(1− t)
−t(1− t)
0
t(1− t)
0
 ,

t2 − t+ 1
1− t
t
0
0
−t(1− t)

}
.
This can be verified through simple calculations. For example, take
the first of those and take the dot product of it with the first row of
T3w we get
1 · 1− 1 · (1− t)− t · 1+ 0 · (1− t) + t · 0+ 0 · 0
= 1− 1+ t− t+ 0 = 0.
Also, as long as t 6= 0, 1, it is easy to see that these vectors are linearly
independent.
If we take another weighting vector w = (1, t′, 0), the only case in
which these null spaces would be equal is when t = t′. This can
be seen by taking the first vector given in the null space above, and
substituting t′ for t, andmultiplying by our original positionalmatrix.
For example, the dot product of this vector with the first row of T3w is
1 · 1− 1 · (1− t′)− t · 1+ 0 · (1− t′) + t · 0+ 0 · 0
= 1− 1+ t′ − t+ 0 = t− t′.
Thus, this product is only zero if t = t′, and so this vector is only in
the null space of our original positional map if t = t′. Also, if we
calculate the individual null spaces for the cases in which t = 1 and
t = 0, these are also unique from the spaces given above. Therefore,
ker T3w = ker T3w′ only if w = w
′.
Now, assuming that the theorem holds for maps on n− 1 candidates,
examine the case of maps on n candidates. Let Tnw|(A, i) be defined
as the submatrix of Tnw formed by the columns where candidate A is
ranked in the ith place. For example, observe that the positional map
on 4 candidates, where w = [1, s, t, 0], is as follows:
T4w=

1 1 1 1 1 1 s s t 0 t 0 s s t 0 t 0 s s t 0 t 0
s s t 0 t 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 t 0 s s 0 t t 0 s s 0 t
t 0 s s 0 t t 0 s s 0 t 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 t 0 t s s
0 t 0 t s s 0 t 0 t s s 0 t 0 t s s 1 1 1 1 1 1
 .
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Columns number 7, 8, 13, 14, 19, and 20 of T4w all correspond to A be-
ing placed in second place (where A gets s points), so
T4w|(A, 2) =

s s s s s s
1 1 t 0 t 0
t 0 1 1 0 t
0 t 0 t 1 1
 .
If we restrict our attention to this submatrix, we notice that the rows
are comprised of a constant vector (in the row corresponding to can-
didate A), and row vectors consistent with those from the positional
map on 3 candidates.
In general, if Tnw has weighting vector w = [1,w2, . . . ,wn−1, 0], then
the submatrix Tnw|(A, i) is of the form Tn−1w with weighting vector
w = [1,w2, . . . ,wi−1,wi+1, . . . ,wn−1, 0] with an extra constant row of
weight wi.
We now take two positional maps on n candidates with weighting
vectors w = [1,w2, . . . ,wn−1, 0] and w′ = [1,w′2, . . . ,w′n−1, 0], and as-
sume that their kernels are identical. Now, for each vector in the null
space of Tn−1w , we will construct a corresponding vector in the null
space of Tnw. First notice that if we take any vector in the null space
of Tn−1w , then it is also in the null space of Tnw|(A, i). It is trivial to see
that a vector which is in the null space of Tn−1w has a dot product of
zero with any row in Tnw|(A, i) which corresponds to Tn−1w . However,
it only takes summing the rows of Tn−1w to see that the all-ones vector
is in the row space of this map, and is thus orthogonal to everything
in the kernel. Thus the dot product of any vector in the kernel of Tn−1w
with the all-wi vector is also zero, so this vector is also in the kernel
of Tnw|(A, i). Therefore, we can treat each of these vectors as though
they had been restricted by (A, i), and then expand them by assigning
zeros to all of the missing entries. By our assumption, the null spaces
of both positional maps (Tnw and Tnw′) are identical, thus all of these
specifically constructed vectors are in the null space of both maps.
Thus, ker Tn−1w′ = ker T
n−1
w′ .
For example, the vector v = (1, t − 1,−1, 1 − t, 0, 0)T is in the null
space of T3w=[1,t,0], so it is also in the null space of T
4
w=[1,s,t,0]|(A, 2).
Thus
v¯ = (0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 1, t− 1, 0, 0, 0, 0, − 1, 1− t, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0, 0)T
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is in the null space of T4w=[1,s,t,0]. Finally, restricting again so the same
columns of T4w′=[1,s′,t′,0], v is in the null space of T
3
w′=[1,t′,0]. Since this
can be done for all vectors in the null space of either map on 3 candi-
dates, it follows that ker T3w′=[1,t′,0] = ker T
3
w′=[1,t′,0].
But, by our inductive hypothesis, this means that the corresponding
submaps must be identical. Rather, ker Tn−1w′ = ker T
n−1
w′ implies that
these reduced weighting vectors are equal. By the nature of our re-
striction to Tnw|(A, i), this ensures that wj = w′j for all j 6= i. In our
example, we showed specifically that t = t′. But since i was arbitrary
within the bounds of 2 ≤ i ≤ n− 1, this implies that wj = w′j for all
2 ≤ j ≤ n− 1. Thus w = w′ for the positional map on n candidates.
From this result, we now have that if there is a weighting vector which
could minimize conflict between the pairwise and positional tallies in this
way (in terms of compatible kernels), then it is unique. Thus we are only
left with the task of finding the unique weighting vector satisfying this re-
quirement.
Notice, if we construct some QSn-module homomorphism
ς : M(n−2,1,1) → M(n−1,1),
we can compare the kernels of the pairs and positional maps through their
images. Namely, we will try to construct ς such that
ς ◦ P(p) = Tw(p),
for all profiles p ∈ M(n−1,1). In other words, we want the diagram in Figure
3.1 to commute.
M(1,...,1)
Tw
$$I
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
II
P // M(n−2,1,1)
ς

M(n−1,1)
Figure 3.1: Diagram of relationships between profile and tally spaces for
fully ranked data.
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This is useful because if we can find some ς for which ς ◦ P is a surjective
map, then it will have a kernel isomorphic to that of Tw. However, these
kernels will be equal only if the kernel of P is contained in the kernel of Tw.
We can see this by taking some profile p. If p is in the kernel of P, then it is
certainly in the kernel of ς ◦ P. Therefore, if these maps commute with Tw,
then p is also in the kernel of this positional map. Similarly, if p is in the
kernel of Tw, then it must also be in the kernel of ς ◦ P, and in turn, P.
One such ς : M(n−2,1,1) → M(n−1,1) would be to map an outcome in
M(n−2,1,1), to, for each candidate A, the sum of the points for A > X (over
all other candidates X). For the sake of normalizing results, we will then
divide this result by n− 1. For example, if we had an outcome which gave
one point for the pair A > B, and one point for A > C, this would map
under ς to two points for A, and no points elsewhere (all divided by n− 1).
This map must have the desired kernel, as ς ◦ P is surjective. And indeed,
this is true for the Borda Count!
Theorem 3.3. If we take P to be the standard pairs map, ς to be defined as above,
and Tw to be the positional tally defined as the Borda Count, then ς ◦ P(p) =
Tw(p), for all profiles p ∈ M(n−1,1).
Proof. Let’s take the basis vector e1 = (1, 0, . . . , 0), which is equivalent to
one vote for the ranking X1 > X2 > ... > Xn and no votes otherwise.
Under the pairs map, this profile gets tallied as one point for each pair
Xi > Xj for all i > j, and no points otherwise. Under ς, this thenmaps
to the positional outcome of n−in−1 points for each candidate Xi. First
note that this is clearly not a tie, so must have a non-zero projections
into S(n−1,1). Since these irreducible submodules are cyclic, it must
be that ς ◦ P is indeed surjective. Now, if we take our original profile
and map it directly to the positional space using the Borda Count, we
clearly get the same result. Thus Tw(e1) = ς ◦ P(e1). Since these are
QSn-module homomorphisms, if this is true for one elementary basis
vector, this must be true for all elements of the profile space. Thus,
for all p ∈ M(1,...,1),
Tw(p) = ς ◦ P(p).
Thus, the above diagram commutes.
Theorem 3.4. The Borda Count is the unique positional weighting scheme which
minimizes conflict with the pairwise map for fully-ranked data.
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This concludes our exploration of the fully-ranked case. However, not
only does this result agree with previous work done by Saari, but it gener-
alizes nicely to partially ranked data. In the following chapter, Chapter 4,
we will use similar techniques to find an analog to the Borda Count using
similar maximization criteria.

Chapter 4
Extending to Partial Rankings
Althoughmuch theory has been developed around voting on full rankings,
it is not always practical to ask voters for that much information. For ex-
ample, as mentioned before, if there were even just ten candidates, asking
for a full ranking would give voters 10! = 3, 620, 800 choices. Thus, it may
prove useful to extend the theory to include partial rankings.
Asmentioned in Section 2.3, we can view profile spaces asQSn-modules.
Namely, if we ask for data of a shape λ, then we can represent the pro-
file space for this data as the permutation module Mλ. Of course, there
are partial rankings which cannot be represented by a simple combina-
torial composition. However, many of the natural partial ranking struc-
tures can be represented this way—and we are restricting our studies to
this kind of data. In fact, we concentrate specifically on data of the shape
λ = (n− k, 1, . . . , 1)—ranking k candidates out of n.
Mλ
Tλw
##F
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
F
Pt // M(n−2,1,1)
ς

M(n−1,1)
Figure 4.1: Diagram of relationships between profile and tally spaces for
partially ranked data.
Drawing on the ideas developed in Chapter 3, we begin with a similar
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diagram of our primary tally maps, the diagram seen in Figure 4.1. In this
diagram, M(n−2,1,1) and M(n−1,1) are still the pairwise and positional tally
spaces as in Chapter 3, and ς is the same map from M(n−2,1,1) to M(n−1,1).
Themap Tλw : Mλ → M(n−1,1) is exactly the positional map that we expect it
to be—simply giving the same amount of points to every candidate ranked
at the same level, according to the weighting vector w. For example, if
we were ranking two candidates out of ten, our weighting vector might be
w = [1, 1/2, 0]—this represents giving 1 point to the first place candidate
in each ranking, 1/2 points to the second-place candidate, and no points to
any of the others.
The general pairs map, Pt, needs a bit more attention at this stage how-
ever. Namely, we must define how the pairs map treats ties. One might
first think, in the case that two candidates tie, to give each of them a point.
Or, perhaps we should give neither of them any points. Just as easily, we
might choose to let them split the point. However, just as was the case for
the positional map, a decision that might first appear as frivolous may end
in significant discrepancies. For example, as we will see in Theorem 4.1,
the rank of the general pairs map depends on our choice of this new pa-
rameter. Thus, by changing this parameter, we have the potential to vary
the amount of freedomwe have in choosing a compatible weighting vector.
So, let us define the general pairs map Pt to give an ordered pair AB 1 point
when A is ranked strictly higher than B, t points when A ties with B, and
0 points when A strictly loses to B.
Theorem 4.1. For data of the shape λ = (n− k, 1, . . . , 1), the general pairs map
Pt has rank (n2) + 1 when n = k + 1 or t = 1/2. Otherwise, it has full rank of
n(n− 1).
Proof. Every entry in a vector v in the image of Pt corresponds to some
ordered pair of candidates, say A > B. The number of points given
to this ordered pair is is the number of votes ranking A strictly above
B (denote this xAB) plus t times the number of votes ranking A the
same as B (denote this yAB). Rather,
vA>B = xAB + tyAB.
If we know only this value for any one pair, we cannot reconstruct
any other value in v. Specifically, the number of points assigned to
any ordered pair A > B is independent of the number of points as-
signed to any other ordered pair besides B > A, even if we also know
the total number of votes. For example, if we know vA>B, we have no
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way of calculating vA>C. Therefore, the rank of Pt must be at least (n2).
However, if we also know the total number of people who voted, m,
there are circumstances in which we will be able to recover the value
assigned to B > A: vB>A = xBA + tyBA. When this is the case, we
would only need (n2) + 1 vectors to reconstruct anything in the image
of Pt—one vector corresponding to each (unordered) pair of candi-
dates, and one representing the number of votes cast (represented by
some some scaling of the all-ones vector). This is not to say that we
can recover the number of votes cast from a result without any other
information, but that the ones vectors, which can serve to count this,
is in the image of the pairs map. If we could not generically calculate
the value vB>A from the value vA>B and another generic piece of in-
formation, then the image of the pairs map would be the entire space
(all of the entries in v would be independent of each other), implying
that Pt would have a rank of n(n− 1).
The case when vB>A is recoverable from vA>B and m is exactly when
we can find non-trivial values of a, b, and c such that
a(xAB + tyAB) + b(xBA + tyBA) + c(m) = 0.
Notice first that yAB = yBA, as this is just the number of times A and
B tie, which is symmetric. Also, note that xAB + xBA + yAB = n. In
other words, all of the votes can be accounted for by counting those
ranking A above B, those ranking B above A, and those ranking them
the same. These equalities imply that
xAB(a+ c) + xBA(b+ c) + yAB(ta+ tb+ c) = 0.
Since xAB, xBA, and yAB are arbitrary (depending only on the profile
of votes which generated them), we get the system of equations
a+ c = 0 b+ c = 0 ta+ tb+ c = 0.
This, in turn, gives us that either a = b = c = 0, or t = 1/2. However,
if, instead, we fix yAB = 0 (which is always the case only when we are
asking for full rankings, i.e., n = k+ 1), we get that a = b = −c, for
any value of a. Thus, rankPt = (n2)+ 1 when t = 1/2 or λ = (1, . . . , 1),
and rankPt = n(n− 1) otherwise.
In order to build some intuition for how to choose a value of t for Pt,
we will relate it to P and the full ranking case. Namely, we will create an
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Figure 4.2: Complete diagram of relationships between profile and tally
spaces.
embedding (or lift) ι : Mλ → M(1,...,1). This relationship allows us to define
Pt (and eventually Tλw) in terms of the maps on fully ranked data, with
which we are very familiar. The diagram in Figure 4.2 serves to summarize
these relationships.
In this diagram, the lower triangle corresponds to our study of the fully
ranked case pictured in 3.1. The outer triangle is the analogous correspon-
dence for the partially ranked case, as pictured in 4.1. As shown, the sur-
jection from M(n−2,1,1) to M(n−1,1) is the same for both. Again, the map
ι : Mλ → M(1,...,1) is just the embedding of the partially ranked data into
the fully ranked data. The goal then is to construct our maps such that
every subdiagram in this larger picture commutes. Namely, given a spe-
cific embedding, we may be able to induce our choices of t and w for the
partially ranked mappings from our results on fully ranked data.
One natural choice for ι is to take the linear extensions of the partial
rankings. This is to say that every partial ranking gets mapped to the sum
of the full rankings which preserve the order imposed by the partial rank-
ing. To allow for normalization, we will then divide through by the total
number of elements in the sum. For example, if we have the partial ranking
A
BC
DE
,
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this would get mapped to the following direct sum of full rankings
1/4 ·

A A A A
B B C C
C + C + B + B
D E D E
E D E D
 .
In what follows, we concentrate on data of the shape λ = (n− k, 1, . . . , 1)
(ie, ranking the top k candidates out of n).
Now that we have an embedding, we focus our attention back on the
general pairs map, Pt. To induce a value of t, we will ask that the left-most
diagram in Figure 4.2 commute—or, rather, that Figure 4.3 commutes.
Mλ
Pt
##F
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
FF
F
P // M(1,...,1)
ι

M(n−2,1,1)
Figure 4.3: Pairs map diagram.
Another way of stating this is that we require that, for all p ∈ Mλ,
ι ◦ Pt(p) = P(p) . And, in fact, this happens only when we let t = 1/2.
Theorem 4.2. For partially ranked data of the shape λ = (n − k, 1, . . . , 1), we
have Pt(p) = ι ◦ P(p), for all p ∈ Mλ if and only if t = 1/2.
Proof. Let etλ be a standard basis element in Mλ, namely a profile which
has one vote for a single ranking tλ, and no votes for any other rank-
ing. For every pair of candidates A and B, if A > B in etλ , then A > B
also in every permutation summand in the corresponding element of
M(1,...,1). Thus, one point will be given to A > B in the pairs space
regardless of whether we map it by Pt or by ι and then by P. Simi-
larly, if B > A, then A > B would get zero points in the pairs space
by either map. However, if A ∼ B in the Tλ, then it is easy to see that
A will beat B in exactly half of the summands of the linear extension
of tλ, and Bwill beat A in the other half. Thus both A > B and B > A
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will get 1/2 of a point if we map etλ by way of P ◦ ι. Thus, in order to
force Pt(etλ) = P ◦ ι(etλ), wemust define t = 1/2. Recall thatQSn acts
transitively onMλ—meaning that we can generate all ofMλ from one
basis element by acting on it by elements of QSn—and that all three
of these maps areQSn-module homomorphisms. Therefore, since we
have proven that tmust be equal to 1/2 for one basis element, it must
be true that t = 1/2 in general. In short, ι ◦ Pt(p) = P(p), for all
p ∈ Mλ if and only if t = 1/2.
Now, from Theorem 4.1, we know that the rank of P1/2 is equal to (n2) +
1. In turn, by the same dimensions argument used in Theorem 3.1, we have
that
img(P1/2) ∼= S(n) ⊕ S(n−1,1) ⊕ S(n−2,1,1).
Recall that Theorem 3.2 states that ker Tw = ker Tw′ if and only if w = w′
for full rankings. Similar arguments can be used to show that this result
holds for partial rankings as well.
Theorem 4.3. Let Tλw be the positional tally map on data of the shape λ = (n−
k, 1, . . . , 1)with weighting vectorw. Then kerTλw = kerTλw′ if and only ifw = w
′.
Proof. The following proof will largely mimic that of Theorem 3.2. If we
wish to induct on the number of candidates n, our base case for λ =
(n− k, 1, . . . , 1) is bounded below by n = k+ 1, as any smaller quan-
tity has no meaning. However, this implies that the base case for in-
duction will be on data of the shape λbase = (1, . . . , 1), which is a full
ranking. By Theorem 3.2, kerTλbasew = kerT
λbase
w′ if and only if w = w
′.
We now fix k and induct on n—finding a submatrix of the positional
map on n candidates that mimics the map on n− 1 candidates.
Assume kerT(n−k,1,...,1)w = kerT
(n−k,1,...,1)
w′ . In this case, we pick out
the rows which correspond to one candidate being bottom ranked.
Rather, our restriction will be T(n−k,1,...,1)w |(A, n). For example, the po-
sitional map for λ = (2, 1, 1) is as follows:
T(2,1,1)w =

1 1 1 t 0 0 t 0 0 t 0 0
t 0 0 1 1 1 0 t 0 0 t 0
0 t 0 0 t 0 1 1 1 0 0 t
0 0 t 0 0 t 0 0 t 1 1 1
 .
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Then Tλw|(A, n) is the submatrix of Tλw restricted to the columns where
A is ranked last. Then
T(2,1,1)w |(A, 4) =

0 0 0 0 0 0
1 1 t 0 t 0
t 0 1 1 0 t
0 t 0 t 1 1
 .
The rows of T(n−k,1,...,1)w |(A, n) are precisely the same as the rows of
T(n−1−k,1,...,1)w with an extra row of zeros. Just as in Theorem 3.2, we
can construct a profile in the kernel of T(n−k,1,...,1)w for each profile
in the kernel of T(n−k,1,...,1)w |(A, n) (and the same for T(n−k,1,...,1)w′ and
T(n−k,1,...,1)w′ |(A, n)). We simply extend the profile by assigning zeros
to all of the missing entries. Since we assumed that ker T(n−k,1,...,1)w =
ker T(n−k,1,...,1)w′ , by taking profiles in the kernel of T
(n−1−k,1,...,1)
w , ex-
tending them, and then restricting again them for T(n−1−k,1,...,1)w′ , this
forces that ker T(n−1−k,1,...,1)w = ker T
(n−1−k,1,...,1)
w′ . Since we did not
drop any weights in this case, this immediately implies that w = w′.
Thus, by the same reasoning that we applied to full rankings, there is
one particular uniqueweighting vector whichwill serve to complement the
pairs map.
In changing focus to the positional maps, we will have to address a
fine-point of commutativity. As we will see, if we take some basis element
in M(n−k,1,...,1), and map it through Tw ◦ ι, we will get non-zero points for
the bottom-ranked candidates in our original partial ranking. However,
if we recall that adding multiples of the all-ones vector and scaling both
do not affect the outcome of an election, we can still design a weighting
vector which will coincide nicely with the functional composition of ι and
Tw. Specifically, we want a weighting vector w such that TwBorda ◦ ι(p) =
Tλw(p)− q · 1n, where q · 1n is some rational multiple of the all-ones vector
in the positional space.
Again take a partial ranking from M(n−k,1,...,1). If we pass it through ι
and then Tw, we will get a Borda-like progression for the top k candidates–
the first place candidate will get 1 point, and the next k− 1 candidates after
this will get sequentially 1n−1 fewer points. If we consider then that every
candidate who was in the bottom tier will occupy each of the lower rank-
ings the same number of times in the summands, it becomes clear that the
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number of points each of these bottom-ranked candidates will get will be
equal to
b ≡ 1
n− k ·
n−k
∑
i=1
i− 1
n− 1.
For example, observe what happens to a profile which gives one vote
to the ranking,
tλ =
A
B
C D E
.
If we map etλ into M(1,...,1), we get
ι(etλ) = 1/6 ·

A A A A A A
B B B B B B
C + C + C + C + C + C
D D E E F F
E F E F E F
F E F E F E
 .
Then, applying the Borda Count to this profile,
Tw ◦ ι(etλ) =

1
4/5
3/5
1/6(2 · 2/5+ 2 · 1/5+ 2 · 0)
1/6(2 · 2/5+ 2 · 1/5+ 2 · 0)
1/6(2 · 2/5+ 2 · 1/5+ 2 · 0)
 =

1
4/5
3/5
1/5
1/5
1/5
 .
As we can see, this vector has non-zero values assigned to the bottom-
ranked candidates. This might imply that there would be no weighting
vector which would commute with P ◦ ι. However, as mentioned previ-
ously, we can subtract multiples of the all-ones vector (1/5 · 1 in our exam-
ple), and scale (again, by 11−1/5 in this example). The result for our example
would then be that Tw ◦ ι(etλ) is equivalent to (1, 3/5, 2/4, 0, 0, 0)T.
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We now solve for these values in general. First, we simplify b:
b =
1
n− k ·
n−k
∑
i=1
i− 1
n− 1
=
1
(n− k)(n− 1) ·
[
n−k
∑
i=1
i+
n−k
∑
i=1
1
]
=
n− k+ 1
2(n− 1) −
1
n− 1
=
1
2
(
1− k
n− 1
)
Thus, if we take the Borda Count on n candidates for the first k candidates,
and normalize this by subtracting b from every value, and then dividing
through by 1− b, we get the ith value (where 1 ≤ i ≤ k) to be
wi =
n−i
n−1 − 12
(
1− kn−1
)
1− 12
(
1− kn−1
) ,
= 1− 2(i− 1)
n+ k− 1
As stated above, we can expect only one such weighting vector (up to nor-
malization). Thus, if we choose the embedding of linear extensions, this
proves the following theorem.
Theorem 4.4. The unique analog to the Borda Count for data of the shape λ =
(n− k, 1, . . . , 1) is a positional map which gives the ith place candidate 1− 2(i−1)n+k−1
points for 1 ≤ i ≤ k and zero points for all last-place candidates.

Chapter 5
Conclusion and Further Work
We have been able to construct an approach to comparing voting meth-
ods using algebraic techniques. Using this approach, we were able to re-
cover established results pertaining to the fully-ranked case. Specifically,
we found that among the positional methods, the Borda count elicits the
least amount of conflict with the pairwise method of tallying votes. We
have also been able to derive similar results for a particular shape of par-
tially ranked data. Namely, for data which ranks k candidates from n, the
analagous positional method is a scaled linear modification of the Borda
Count as given in Theorem 4.4.
There is still much work to be done in this area, particularly with re-
spect to partially ranked data. Firstly, one could explore what arises in
the case that the general pairs map gives some weight other than 12 to
ties. As given in Chapter 4, the rank of the pairs map drastically increases
with any such change. Due to this increase in rank, preliminary compu-
tational results have implied that other general pairs maps allow for more
freedom in a choice of positional map. Since the image of the pairs map
has one more isomorphic copy of the irreducible QSn-module S(n−1,1), it
appears as though there is a one-parameter family of weighting vectors
which will elicit the least amount of conflict with the pairs map. For exam-
ple, if we choose to rank 3 from 5 candidates, with a weighting vector of
w = [1, s, t, 0], we get a relationship of t = 2s − 1 guaranteeing maximal
agreement with the pairs map, with varying intervals of s.
Secondly, it would be a natural extension of this work to apply these
methods to other shapes of data. In particular, it may be of interest to con-
sider pairs maps which treat separate classes of ties differently. For exam-
ple, suppose we ask for rankings in the shape λ = (1, 2, n− 3). If there is a
40 Conclusion and Further Work
vote for
A
BC
DE. . .
,
we might consider a pairs map which would give each of B and C 34 of
a point, but would give each of D and E 12 of a point. In this light, we
could assign the pairs map a similar kind of weighting vector to that of the
positional map, which designates how it will treat various classes of ties.
However, if we continue to focus on partial rankings which correspond to
compositions, and use linear extensions to relate the full and partial rank-
ings, the pairs map is still restricted to giving each candidate in any class of
tie 12 of a point.
Finally, it may also be of interest to attempt to apply similar techniques
to other voting methods. For example, it may be possible to express ap-
proval voting using similar algebraic tools. However, after short consider-
ation it becomes apparent that methods which require stages of tallying or
elimination of candidates (such as instant run-off elections) are more dif-
ficult to approach from our perspective. This is not to say, though, that
algebraic techniques will not prove useful in approaching these methods.
Regardless of the particular methods which we choose to study, we
hope that the perspective portrayed herewill help to facilitate a new discus-
sion about voting. The study of voting theory in the context of mathematics
allows the more quantitatively-minded to understand how votingmethods
compare. Beginning to develop this study in the language of algebra and
representation theory opens the doors for a new branch of mathematicians.
Bibliography
[1] David S. Dummit and Richard M. Foote. Abstract Algebra. Upper Sad-
dle River, N.J., Prentice Hall, 1999. Algebra textbook.
[2] Lewis Lum and David J. Kurtz. Voting made easy: A mathematical
theory of election procedures, 1989. A quick guide to Arrow’s theorem.
[3] IainMcLean andArnold B. Urken. Classics of Social Choice. The Univer-
sity of Michigan Press, 1995. Contains translated reprints of major papers
from early voting theorists and commentary on their context and content.
[4] Thomas C. Ratliff. A comparison of Dodgson’s method and the Borda
count. Econom. Theory, 20(2):357–372, 2002. This paper takes a similar
geometric approach to that of Saari, but compares Borda to a modification of
Condorcet’s method. In particular, it points out that more problems may arise
when we seemingly improve upon tallying methods in one way or another.
[5] Donald G. Saari. Symmetry, voting, and social choice. Math. Intelli-
gencer, 10(3):32–42, 1988. This article is a colloquial introduction to Saari’s
approach to voting theory. It contains many good examples of various kinds
of paradoxes that arise from different methods of tallying votes.
[6] Donald G. Saari. Explaining all three-alternative voting outcomes. J.
Econom. Theory, 87(2):313–355, 1999. This artical mostly concentrates on
decomposing the voting space in the case of 3 candidates. This is a good in-
troductory article to Saari’s geometric methods in that it stays in the context
of an example to help simplify the ideas.
[7] Donald G. Saari. Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. I. Pair-
wise votes. Econom. Theory, 15(1):1–53, 2000. This is the first of two
papers which go into depth in comparing pairwise and positional tally meth-
ods. They give a thorough description of voting spaces for fully ranked data
using geometric methods.
42 Bibliography
[8] Donald G. Saari. Mathematical structure of voting paradoxes. II. Posi-
tional voting. Econom. Theory, 15(1):55–102, 2000. This is the second of
two major papers on analyzing voting methods. See “Mathematical structure
of voting paradoxes. I. Pairwise votes”.
[9] Donald G. Saari. Decisions and Elections: Explaining the Unexpected.
Cambridge University Press, 2001. This book spends extra time build-
ing intuition for why our expectations might be as they are. It was written
in a similar tone to his article “Symmetry, Voting, and Social Choice”, in
that it is geared for the educated layman. It does, however, also cover Saari’s
geometric methods.
[10] Donald G. Saari and Fabrice Valognes. Geometry, voting, and para-
doxes. Math. Mag., 71(4):243–259, 1998. This paper is similar to the three
outcome paper in that it takes a simple approach to Saari’s geometric methods.
It is a good introductory paper for getting a grasp on the geometric approach
to voting.
[11] Bruce Sagan. The Symmetric Group : Representations, Combinatorial Algo-
rithms, and Symmetric Functions. Springer-Verlag New York, Inc., 2001.
A significant amount of theory for tabloids and irreducible subgroups for par-
tially ranked data can be found here.
